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Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers.
In a dynamic rational expectations equilibrium model with asymmetric information we show that although
stock-based compensation causes managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening
of the firm's investment opportunities by following largely sub-optimal investment policies. This problem
is especially severe for growth firms, whose stock prices then become over-valued while managers
hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both
stock and earnings performance instead induces a combination of high effort, truth revelation and optimal
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Compensation based on the stock price is a very important feature of executive contracts
of publicly traded ﬁrms in the US and elsewhere (Hall and Liebman 1998, Murhpy 1999,
Murphy 2003). While a large theoretical literature views stock-based compensation as a
solution to an agency problem between shareholders and managers,1 there is also a growing
body of empirical evidence that shows that it leads to earnings management, misreporting,
and outright fraudulent accounting. Does stock-based compensation amplify the tension
between the incentives of managers and shareholders instead of aligning them? In this paper
we analyze a dynamic rational expectations equilibriummodel, and identify conditions under
which stock-based executive compensation leads to misreporting, suboptimal investment,
run-up and a subsequent sharp decline in equity prices. We show that the problem is
especially severe for high growth companies. Ironically, high growth ﬁrms are exactly the
ﬁrms that rely more heavily on stock-based compensation (Murphy (2003)). In contrast,
our model shows that for these ﬁrms, a compensation that is based on a combination of
dividends and stock performance dominates a stock-based compensation.2
More speciﬁcally, we study a hidden action model of a ﬁrm that is run by a CEO,
whose compensation is linked to either the stock price or the dividends. The ﬁrm initially
experiences high growth in investment opportunities and the CEO must invest intensively to
exploit the growth options. The key feature of our model is that at some point in time the
ﬁrm “matures” and the rate of growth of its investment opportunities slows down. The CEO
is able to aﬀect the time at which the ﬁrm matures by exercising costly eﬀort. But when the
investmentopportunities growth does inevitably slow down, the investmentpolicy of the ﬁrm
should change appropriately. We assume asymmetric information: while the CEO privately
observes the decrease in the growth rate, shareholders are oblivious to it. Moreover, they
do not observe investments, but base their valuation only on dividends. When investment
opportunities decline, the CEO has two options: telling the truth, or behaving as if nothing
had happened. Telling the truth leads to an immediate decline in the stock price. If the
CEO chooses not to report the change in the business environment of the ﬁrm, the stock
price does not fall, as the outside investors have no way of deducing this event. In the latter
case the equity becomes overvalued.
Behaving as if nothing has changed means that the CEO must follow a sub-optimal invest-
ment strategy to maintain the pretense. We assume that as long as the reported dividends
over time are consistent with the high growth rate, the CEO keeps his job. However, the
ﬁrst deviation from the high growth proﬁle elicits an immediate audit from the shareholders,
which reveals the investment strategy followed by the CEO. If the investment strategy was
suboptimal, the CEO is ﬁred. These assumptions collapse this part of the dynamic game into
a static reporting game, in which the CEO chooses whether to tell the truth or to conceal,
and the stock is priced accordingly over time.
1See for example Holmstrom (1979) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1993).
2We use the term “dividends” throughout to be consistent with the model. However, the same logic
would hold for earnings or cash ﬂows. Indeed, it applies to any aggregate measure that is harder for the
manager to manipulate than its components.
2We start by analyzing the equilibrium at the time the rate of growth of the investment
opportunities slows down. First, we show that when the CEO compensation is based on his
reported dividends, the only pure strategy Nash equilibrium is separating, in which the CEO
tells the truth and follows the optimal investment policy. In sharp contrast, we ﬁnd that
whenever the CEO has a large stock-based component in his compensation, and the range of
possible growth rates is large, there is a pooling Nash equilibrium for most parameter values.
In this equilibrium, the CEO of a maturing ﬁrm follows a suboptimal investment policy in
order to maintain the pretense that investment opportunities are still strong. Since the CEO
is interested in keeping a high growth proﬁle for as long as possible, initially he invests in
negative NPV projects as storage of cash, and later on foregoes positive NPV projects in
order to meet rapidly-growing demand for dividends. In short, he destroys value.
These predictions of our model are consistent with a growing evidence that stock-based
executive compensation is associated with earnings management, misreporting and restate-
ments of ﬁnancial reports, and outright fraudulent accounting. Healy (1985) shows that ex-
ecutives manage accruals to maximize bonus payments. Likewise, Beneish (1999) ﬁnds that
managers exercise stock options and are net equity sellers in periods of overstated earnings.
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Ke (2005), show that the use of discretionary accruals
and earning management are more pronounced at ﬁrms where the CEO’s compensation is
closely tied to the value of the stock price. Similarly, Burns and Kedia (2006) ﬁnd that CEOs
with option package that is more sensitive to the stock price are more likely to misreport,
and ﬁnd that restatements are more prevalent in faster growing industries. Finally, Kedia
and Philippon (2006) ﬁnd that fraudulent accounting is associated with excessive investment
and that manager exercise options during periods of suspicious accounting.
We then solve for the ex-ante incentive for the CEO to exert costly eﬀort and prolong
the high growth options period of the ﬁrm. Consistent with previous literature, our model
shows that stock-based compensation is more eﬀective than dividends-based compensation
to provide the managers with the incentive to exercise costly eﬀort, and thus increase the
ﬁrms’ investment opportunities. Dividends-based compensation tends to induce a low man-
agerial eﬀort, unless the growth prospects of the ﬁrm are unusually high, or the manager is
particularly patient. Intuitively, very high-growth prospects imply large investments, which
yield low current dividends. It follows that only managers with low discount rates are will-
ing to wait a long time to be compensated for their current eﬀort. In contrast, stock-based
contracts induce the manager to increase the growth option of the ﬁrm because the latter
are capitalized in the stock price. In equilibrium, however, the stock price discounts the fact
that when the ﬁrm matures in the future, the manager will conceal this fact for a while and
invest suboptimally.
Indeed, shareholders in our model face a diﬃcult decision. On the one hand, the common
wisdom of hidden action models is to align the manager’s incentive with those of investors by
tying his compensation to the stock price. On the other hand, stock-price-based compensa-
tion may lead the manager to invest suboptimally and destroy value. The trade oﬀ is made
apparent by the fact that for reasonable parameter values, and especially for medium to high
growth companies, we ﬁnd that dividends-based compensation induces a low-eﬀort/reveal
3equilibrium, while the stock-based compensation induces a high-eﬀort/conceal equilibrium.
That is, the cost of inducing high managerial eﬀort ex-ante comes from the suboptimal
investment policy after the slowdown in investment opportunities.3
We show that this double incentive problem (i.e. induce high eﬀort and truth telling) can
be overcome by a combined compensation package: by appropriately choosing a combination
of dividends and stock-based compensation, it is possible to shift the equilibrium to a high
eﬀort / reveal equilibrium and obtain the ﬁrst best for shareholders. Most important, we
show that diﬀerent types of ﬁrms need to put in place a diﬀerent composition of dividends
and stocks in the compensation package. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the CEO’s compensation
package of growth ﬁrms, that is, those with high investment opportunities growth and high
return on capital, should have only little stock-price sensitivity, but large dividend sensitivity
to induce ﬁrst best. Vice versa, ﬁrms with medium-low investment growth and low return
on capital should rely more heavily on a high price sensitivity in the CEO’s compensation
packages. Intuitively, the (forward looking) stock price of growth ﬁrms increases sharply over
time so long the CEO can prove that such investment opportunities are available. Thus, the
CEO has a strong incentive to conceal the change in investment opportunities when the time
comes. Putting a large weight on dividends-based incentives in the full package in this case is
more appropriate. However, if the compensation is not sensitive to the stock price at all, then
the CEO may not exert costly eﬀort, which is also a bad outcome for shareholders. Thus, a
composition of both incentives schemes may achieve the ﬁrst best. We calculate numerical
values for the maximum and minimum weight on the stock component of the compensation
packages and ﬁnd that not only they diﬀer across ﬁrms, but that for most ﬁrms the weight
on stock is strictly between zero and one.
Our paper is related to the literature on managerial “short-termism” and myopic corpo-
rate behavior (Stein (1989), Bebchuk and Stole (1993)). We present a picture of a ﬁrm, that
is temporarily overvalued, and destroys value to maintain this appearance. Jensen (2005)
argues that the agency costs of overvalued equity are the main causes of corporate fraud in
recent years. Likewise, Aghion and Stein (2007) develop a model in which a ﬁrm can devote
eﬀort either to increasing growth, or to improving proﬁt margins. They show that if the
ﬁrm’s manager cares about the current stock price, he will favor the growth strategy when
there is a sentiment for growth ﬁrms. While we pursue a similar line of inquiry, we do so
in a context of a rational expectations model that endogenizes overvaluation. Thus, diﬀer-
ently from Jensen (2005) and Aghion and Stein (2007) our results do not rely on behavioral
biases, and apply to a wider range of ﬁrms. In terms of assumptions, our paper bears some
similarities to Miller and Rock (1985) who study the eﬀects of dividends announcements
on the value of the ﬁrm. Similar to Eisfeldt and Rampini (2007) and Inderst and Mueller
(2006), we assume that the CEO has a signiﬁcant informational advantage over investors,
and that investors observe neither the true earnings nor the true investment, but must rely
on aggregate announcements for their valuation. However, the emphasis of our paper is quite
diﬀerent in two dimensions: we focus on the beliefs about future growth rates, rather than
3Diﬀerent shareholders of the ﬁrm may not agree on the optimal equilibrium. Those investors holding
stock for shorter periods are interested in high eﬀort and do not much care about the subsequent suboptimal
investments. Long-term investors have the reverse preferences.
4about current dividends levels; and we link them to the incentives of the managers.
Our paper is also related to Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006), Goldman and Slezak
(2006), and Kumar and Langberg (2007). Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) study
an agency model of stock-based executive compensation in a speculative stock market and
show that optimal compensation contracts may emphasize short-term stock performance,
at the expense of long-run fundamental value. Goldman and Slezak (2006) develop an
agency model in which stock-based compensation induces managers to exert eﬀort but also
to divert ﬁrm resources. Kumar and Langberg (2007) present a static model in which
manipulation and overinvestment coexist in a rational expectations equilibrium. In their
framework managers derive private beneﬁts from larger investments, and have informational
advantage, thus they can misrepresent their true performance and prospects. The driving
force behind the overinvestment is, therefore, the inability of the shareholders to precommit
to ex post ineﬃcient investments, which signiﬁcantly restricts the set of feasible contracts.
Overall, these papers complement each other, and conclude that contrary to the traditional
prescriptions, providing managers with high-powered short-run incentives based on the stock
price may be dangerous, because the stock price accumulates the beliefs about the uncertain
future. The manager can use deceptive or even fraudulent practices that destroy value to
maintain the pretense of a bright tomorrow.
Our model also yields additional predictions, that are consistent with the extant empirical
evidence. In particular, the model predicts that meeting earnings forecasts is a key objective
for CEOs who are concealing the worsening of investment opportunity growth, and in fact
CEOs would forego positive NPV projects to achieve this goal. This implication is consistent
with the evidence in Graham et al. (2005), who present the results of an extensive survey
among the CFOs. Most CEOs state that they would forego a positive NPV project if it causes
them to miss the earnings target; high tech ﬁrms are much more likely to do so. They also are
much more likely to cut R&D and other discretionary spending to meet the target. High tech
ﬁrms believe more strongly that missing earnings target introduces uncertainty and raises
red ﬂags about the company. All of these ﬁndings are consistent with the assumptions and
predictions of the model. Similarly, our model also predicts that for high growth companies,
failing to meet earnings forecasts would elicit a large drop in price, as it reveals that ﬁrm
had a worsening of investment opportunities in the past, and that capital has been eaten
up by suboptimal investments by managers who were instead keeping up the pretense to
be a growth company. This prediction is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings of Skinner
and Sloan (2002), who show that a decline in the ﬁrm value following a failure to meet
the analysts’ forecasts is much more pronounced in high growth ﬁrms. Likewise, Barth,
Elliott and Finn (1999) show that ﬁrms with patterns of increasing earnings have higher
price-earnings multiples.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the model setup and an-
alyzes the benchmark case of full information. Section III presents the case with asymmetric
information and solves for the equilibrium. Section IV contains the results about managerial
eﬀort and optimal compensation. Section V concludes.
5II The Model
We consider a publicly traded ﬁrm that is run by a CEO who chooses the ﬁrm’s investment
policy. Our model is dynamic and has three key ingredients: (a) the available investment
opportunities and the investments of the ﬁrm at any point in time are private information of
the CEO; (b) the CEO’s compensation depends on the ﬁrm’s performance; (c) the CEO can
aﬀect the set of available investment opportunities by exercising costly eﬀort. We begin the
setup with a description of the technology and discuss the ﬁrst best solution as a benchmark
for the subsequent analysis. Section III introduces asymmetric information and describes
the CEO’s preferences, and exogenous compensation schemes. We then solve the model by
assuming a given level of the managerial eﬀort and derive the two equilibria under diﬀerent
compensation regimes. Only then, in Section IV, we endogenize the managerial eﬀort and
discuss optimal compensation.
II.A Technology
The ﬁrm investment opportunities are described by the following technology: Given a level
of capital Kt, ﬁrm’s operating proﬁts Yt are given by
Yt =
 
zKt if Kt ≤ Jt
zJt if Kt >J t
(1)
where z is the rate of return on capital, and Jt deﬁnes an upper bound on the amount of
productive capital that depends on the characteristics of the technology itself, operating
costs, demand and so on. The Leontief technology speciﬁcation (1) implies constant return
to scale up to the upper bound Jt, and then zero return for Kt >J t. This simple speciﬁcation
of a decreasing return to scale technology allows us to conveniently model the growth rate in
proﬁtable investment opportunities, whose diﬀerent dynamics across ﬁrms will be the driving
force of our model.




where ˜ g is a constant. The combination of (1) and (2) captures our idea of growing investment
opportunities. Indeed, since the technology displays constant returns to scale up to Jt,i t
is optimal to keep the capital at the level Jt as long as the investments are proﬁtable,
which we assume throughout the paper. Figure 1 illustrates the growth rate in investment
opportunities.
Finally, we assume that to remain productive, the ﬁrm must maintain a minimum level
of capital Kt ≥ Kt,w h e r eKt is exogenously speciﬁed. We assume for simplicity that
Kt ≥ Kt = ξJt for 0 ≤ ξ<1( 3 )
6where Jt is deﬁned in (2). This, as we will see later, is a technical assumption and ξ is a free
parameter.
The ﬁrm does not retain earnings, so that the annual dividend rate equals its operating
proﬁts Yt derived from its stock of capital, Kt, less the investment it chooses to make, It.
Formally, given the technology in (1), dividends are
Dt = z min(Kt,J t) − It. (4)
Finally, the existing stock of capital depreciates at the rate of δ.
II.B Firm Life Cycle
The ﬁrm is born as a high growth ﬁrm. At some random time τ∗ the ﬁrm matures, and the
growth rate in investment opportunities slows down. Formally
˜ g =
 
G for t<τ ∗
g for t ≥ τ∗ , (5)
where G>g . The time at which the ﬁrm reaches maturity, i.e. shifts to a lower growth,
is random. For simplicity, we assume that τ∗ is exponentially distributed, with probability




That is, in every instant dt there is a constant probability λ that a shift from G to g occurs.
II.C Benchmark case: Symmetric Information
Consider ﬁrst the benchmark case in which the manager and shareholders share the same
information. To maximize the ﬁrm value the manager must invest to its fullest potential,
that is, to keep Kt = Jt for all t. To ﬁnd the optimal investment policy, notice ﬁrst that the
capital evolution equation is given by:
dKt
dt
= It − δKt. (6)
From (2), the target level of capital, Jt,i sg i v e nb y
Jt =
 
eGt for t<τ ∗
eGτ∗+g(t−τ∗) for t ≥ τ∗ . (7)
Imposing Kt = Jt for every t and using (6) we ﬁnd that the optimal investment policy is
It =
 
(G + δ)eGt for t<τ ∗
(g + δ)eGτ∗+g(t−τ∗) for t ≥ τ∗ . (8)
7The dividend stream of a ﬁrm that fully invests (see (4)) is given by:
Dt = zKt − It =
 
DG
t =( z − G − δ)eGt for t<τ ∗
D
g
t =( z − g − δ)eGτ∗+g(t−τ∗) for t ≥ τ∗ . (9)
The top panel of Figure 2 plots the dynamics of the optimal dividend path for a ﬁrm
with a high growth in investment opportunities until τ∗, and a low growth afterwards. As
the ﬁgure shows, the slowdown in the investment opportunities requires a decline in the





Given the assumptions below, the dividends are always positive. Notice that in (9) the
rate of increase in dividends equals the rate of increase in the investment opportunities, ˜ g.
To calculate the value of the ﬁrm we assume that investors apply a constant discount
rate r to future cash ﬂows. In particular, the discount rate does not depend on the growth
rate of the ﬁrm, as the shift from high growth to low growth is idiosyncratic to the ﬁrm. To
ensure a ﬁnite value of the ﬁrm stock price, we assume
r>G− λ and r>g .
In addition, we assume that
z>r+ δ,
that is, the return on capital is suﬃciently high to compensate for the cost of capital r
and depreciation δ. This assumption implies that it is economically optimal for investors to
provide capital to the company and invest up to its fullest potential, as determined by the
Leontief technology described in (1).
Proposition 1: Under perfect information:







































(z − G − δ)
r + λ − G
+ λ
 
z − g − δ
(r − g)(r + λ − G)
 
(13)
8In the pricing functions (10) and (12) the subscript “fi” stands for “full information”
and superscript “after”i sf o rt ≥ τ∗ and “before”i sf o rt<τ ∗.








(r − g)(r + λ − G)
(z − r − δ)(G − g).
The bottom panel of Figure 2 plots the price path in the benchmark case corresponding to
the dividend path in top panel.
III Asymmetric Information
Clearly the manager has much more information than the investors regarding the future
growth opportunities of the ﬁrm, as well as about its actual investments. We assume that
the decline in investment opportunities is private information of the manager and cannot be
observed by investors. Neither can they observe the investment activity of the ﬁrm. This
assumption is realistic in many industries, and especially the rapidly growing new industries,
as the market does not know how to distinguish between investments and costs. Indeed, in
many industries, and in particular in high tech, almost all the R&D investmentsare expensed
rather than capitalized; and are labeled as such at the discretion of the management. In
mature R&D-intensive industries rules of thumb had been established over time that yield
reasonable estimates of investments in R&D; in newly developing industries such rules had
not yet crystallized. We assume, therefore, that investors have to base the valuation of the
ﬁrm’s prospects only on the dividend stream Dt.4
Shareholders know that at t = 0 the ﬁrm has a given K0 of capital and high growth rate
G of investment opportunities. Since it is costly to monitor the investment strategy of the
ﬁrm every t, shareholders use dividends to assess whether the ﬁrm at any later time t is a
G ﬁrm or a g ﬁrm. As long as the ﬁrm is of type G, they expect a dividend as described in
(9).5 We also assume that shareholders can monitor the manager by performing an audit.
During these audits, the whole history of investments is made public. Our assumption
that shareholders conduct an internal audit every time there is a change in dividend policy
may appear extreme, but it matches the lack of randomness in dividend realizations in our
setting. In a more realistic setting in which dividend realizations are random, the equivalent
assumption is to have shareholders conduct an audit following large changes in dividend
policy.
4While this seems like a strong assumption, it counterbalances other two assumptions that we make,
namely, deterministic production function and deterministic return on capital. Relaxing all of these as-
sumptions to a more realistic situation in which the revenues are imperfectly observed sometime after the
investment, and return on capital and the production function are subject to stochastic shocks makes it
impossible to solve for the ﬁxed point in the dynamic rational expectations equilibrium model. We have no
reason to believe that our results would not hold under this modiﬁcation.
5The assumption that dividends can be used to reduce agency costs and monitor managers has been
suggested by Easterbrook (1984).
9At time τ∗ the CEO has to choose whether to reveal the decline in the growth rate of in-
vestment opportunities, or conceal it. In the case the CEO reveals the shift in fundamentals,
the price drops to P
after
fi,τ∗ as shown above. If the CEO decides to conceal the truth, he must
devise an investment strategy that enables the ﬁrm to continue paying the dividend stream
DG
t in (9), otherwise the shareholders perform an audit and ﬁnd out the truth. Intuitively,
this strategy cannot be supported forever, as investment opportunities are not growing fast
enough. At some point in the future the ﬁrm will have to default on its dividend payment,
in the sense that its dividend Dt will not meet expectations that are consistent with high
growth. We denote that time by T ∗∗ .
III.A Manager’s Preferences
The manager receives a performance-based compensation wt for every t he/she is at the ﬁrm.
To keep the analysis simple, we assume linear preferences
Ut = Et






where T is the time the manager leaves the ﬁrm and β is the discount rate of the manager.
Potentially, T = ∞. However, the departing date T may occur earlier, as the manager may
be ﬁred if the shareholders learn that he has followed a suboptimal investment strategy.
Note that the utility speciﬁcation (14) does not depend on the cost of eﬀort. We introduce
explicitly a description of managerial eﬀort and its utility costs in Section IV. This is to
simplify the exposition and clarify the intuition of the model.






τ∗ e−β(s−t)wsds if reveal strategy
  T ∗∗
τ∗ e−β(s−t)wsds if conceal strategy
. (15)
We consider two types of pure compensation schemes: stock-based and dividends-based
(or earnings-based). While these polar cases are extreme, concentrating on them ﬁrst enables
us to better clarify the intuition behind the incentives provided by dividends or stocks. The






ηpPt for stock-based compensation
ηdDt for dividends-based compensation
,
where ηp and ηd are two positive constants. Their levels are not important for now, but in
Subsection IV.F we will choose them to make the equilibrium present value of payments to
the manager the same under the two compensation schemes. We further assume that β>G ,
which is required to keep the total utility of the manager ﬁnite.
10Finally, we assume that the manager’s decision about the investment policy is ﬁrm-
speciﬁc, and thus it does not aﬀect the systematic risk of the stock and the associated cost
of capital, r.
III.B Conceal Strategy
The reveal equilibrium is very similar to the one analyzed in the benchmark case. We,
therefore, focus on the conceal equilibrium.
Recall that the optimal investment policy is uniquely determined by the decision at time
τ∗, when the ﬁrm matures. Let Kτ∗ be the amount of capital available at time τ∗.T h e
choice of the manager at this point is to either change the dividend payout to reﬂect the new
status of the ﬁrm, or keep dividends that are consistent with a high growth of the company.
In the former case the optimal investment policy is to invest to the fullest potential. The
following Lemma characterizes the optimal policy rule in case the manager conceals the true
state of the ﬁrm.
Lemma 1: Conditional on the decision to conceal the true state at τ∗, the manager’s
optimal investment policy is to maximize the time to “default”, T ∗∗.
The proof is intuitive, and it is instructive to make it explicit here. Conditional on his
decision to conceal the true state g, the manager must provide a dividend stream that is
consistent with the G state. The ﬁrst time the ﬁrm does not deliver the promised dividends,
shareholders perform an audit and the manager is ﬁred, because he did not invest optimally.
However, as long as he delivers the promised dividends, the price of the stock simply reﬂects
the present value of future cash ﬂows conditional on the dividend, and is independent of
anything else. Thus, after τ∗ the manager’s utility is known as long as he holds the job.
Since he loses his job in case of “default”, and earns rents relative to his outside options, he
would like to delay the “default” as much as he can.
Given Lemma 1, we must then calculate the optimal investment strategy that leads to
the longest possible pretense.
III.B.1 Time to “default”
Lemma 1 shows that once the manager chooses to conceal the true state g at τ∗, he will
maintain the same dividend growth as before for as long as he can, since this will delay the
reprisal and allow him to get a ﬂow of payments for longer. Thus the time to “default”,
which is the maximal time the manager can maintain the appearances without violating any
constraints, is the main driving force in this model. The following Proposition characterizes
the maximal time to “default”, T ∗∗, and the associated optimal investment strategy:
Proposition 2: Let Kτ∗− be the capital accumulated in the ﬁrm by time τ∗. A manager
11of the ﬁrm with the rate of growth g, but pretending to be G, chooses to employ all of his
initial capital stock, i.e. Kτ∗ = Kτ∗−.F o rt>τ ∗ the optimal investment, given by










Gτ∗+g(t−τ∗)) − δKt − (z − G − δ)e
Gt (17)
The default time, T ∗∗, is determined by the condition KT ∗∗ = KT ∗∗.
Next we show that the ﬁrm can maintain the pretense for the same amount of time
regardless of the timing of the decline in investment opportunities.
Proposition 3: The time that passes between the decline of growth options to the default
time, h∗∗ = T ∗∗ − τ∗, is independent of the time the ﬁrm matures, τ∗.
Figure 3 presents an illustration of the optimal investment path for a g-ﬁrm pretending
to be a G ﬁrm after τ∗, and it compares it to the optimal investment policy under full
information for a speciﬁc set of parameters. The top panel presents the capital dynamics,
while the investment dynamics are in the bottom panel.
A few comments are in order: First, the optimal capital stock initially exceeds the upper
bound on the employable capital, Kt >J t. This implies that the pretending ﬁrm must
initially invest in negative NPV projects: because of the Leontief technology (1) the capital
stock Kt−Jt has a zero return, yet depreciates at the rate δ. Note that the g ﬁrm has to pay
lower dividends when it pretends to be G than under its own optimal investment dynamics
(see Figure 2). The extra cash is invested in negative NPV projects as a storage of value
that extends the default time T ∗∗ as much as possible.
Second, as the time goes by the pretending ﬁrm engages in disinvestment to raise cash
for the larger dividends of the growing ﬁrm. The ﬁrm can do this as long as its capital Kt
is above the minimal capital Kt. Therefore the technical assumption of a minimal capital
stock in equation (3) essentially captures the time at which the ﬁrm can no longer conceal
the decline in its stock of capital.
Finally, for the realistic parameter values in our example T ∗∗ turns out to be very large,
around 14 years. While this time to “default” is clearly too high, one must recall that it
is based on a very restrictive assumption that the market cannot distinguish at all between
the investments and costs. If the market can partially distinguish between the two – e.g.
the market can spot the large disinvestment required by the g ﬁrm – the time to “default”
is likely to become signiﬁcantly lower.
In a conceal Nash equilibrium, rational investors anticipate the behavior of the managers,
and price the stock accordingly. We derivethe pricingfunction under asymmetricinformation
next.
12III.B.2 Pricing functions
For simplicity of presentation we assume that manager’s compensation is external to the
ﬁrm, thus does not aﬀect its value directly - we assume that these contracts are settled
elsewhere.6 This is a simplifying assumption that does not alter the basic intuition of the
model, but makes the pricing functions much more transparent.
We have shown that the pretending ﬁrm defaults at T ∗∗. The post-default valuation
of the ﬁrm is straightforward since the information is complete. The diﬀerence is that the
ﬁrm does not have suﬃcient capital to employ to its full potential, thus needs to borrow.
Recall that default occurs when KT ∗∗ = KT ∗∗, the minimum capital required to operate.
The optimal capital is JT ∗∗ given in equation (7), thus, the ﬁrm must borrow JT ∗∗ − KT ∗∗.









−r(t−T ∗∗)dt − JT ∗∗(1 − ξ)=e
Gτ∗+g(T ∗∗−τ∗)
 




The pricing formula for t<T ∗∗ is then
Pai,t = Et











The subscript “ai” in (19) stands for “Asymmetric Information”.7 Expression (19) can be
compared with the analogous pricing formula under full information (11): the only diﬀerence
is that the switch time τ∗ is replaced by the (later) T ∗∗, and the price P
after
fi,τ∗ is replaced with
the much lower price PL
ai,T ∗∗. We are able to obtain an analytical solutions:
Proposition 4: Under asymmetric information and conceal strategy equilibrium:









(z − G − δ)




z − r − δ +( r − g)ξ
(r − g)(r + λ − G)
 
(21)
(b) for t<h ∗∗ the value of the stock is:8









6For example, the manager may be selling his shares to outside investors, which has no direct impact on
ﬁrm valuation. Including compensation into the ﬁrm valuation would not change our results qualitatively,
but would signiﬁcantly complicate the exposition.
7Diﬀerently from the case with perfect information, we do not need to specify an “after”a n d“ before”
pricing function, because at τ∗ there is no revelation of the state.
8T h ec a s eo ft<h ∗∗ does not yield additional intuition relative to the case of t ≥ h∗∗, yet it is much
more complex to analyze. For this reason in the rest of the paper, we mainly discuss the case t ≥ h∗∗.
13Comparing the pricing formulas under asymmetric and symmetric information, (20) and
(12), we observe that the ﬁrst term in the constants A
fi
λ and Aai
λ is identical. However,
the second term is smaller in the case of asymmetric information: the reason is that under
asymmetric information, rational investors take into account two additional eﬀects. First,
even if default has not been declared yet, it may be possible that it has already taken place
and the true investment opportunities are growing at a lower rate g for a while (up to h∗∗).
The adjustment e−(G−g)h∗∗ < 1 takes into account this possibility. Secondly, upon default, the
ﬁrm must borrow capital to resume operations, which is manifested in the smaller numerator
of the second term, compared to the equivalent expression in (12).
Next corollary shows that a longer expected time to maturity, τ∗ implies a higher stock
price, everything else equal. The result is important, as the dynamics of the stock price
induces the manager with stock-based compensation to conceal the true growth rate of the
ﬁrm’s investment opportunities.
Corollary 1. The pricing function Pai,t in (20) and (22) is decreasing in λ (and thus
increasing in E[τ∗]=1 /λ)i f
z − r − δ +( r − g)ξ
z − G − δ
<
 





   
 e
(G−g)h∗∗ (23)
Condition (23) is satisﬁed for most parameter values. The absolute value on the right
hand side represents the fact that r − G is not necessarily positive in our framework. The
important restriction is that r + λ − G>0, that is, the probability of a shift to a lower
growth is suﬃciently high, so that the value of the ﬁrm is ﬁnite.
The top panel of Figure 4 illustrates the welfare loss associated with the conceal strategy.
Since the manager‘s compensation is not coming out of the ﬁrm‘s funds, the welfare loss
is equal to the loss of the shareholders that hold the stock for a long-haul relative to what
they would have got under the reveal strategy (full information). For these shareholders,
intermediate prices are of no interest, since they do not intend to sell. These costs can be
measured by the present value (as of τ∗) of the diﬀerence in the dividends paid out to the
shareholders under the two equilibria. Relative to reveal strategy, the conceal strategy pays
lower dividends for a while, as the manager pretends to actively invest, and then must pay
higher dividends, that arise from allegedly high cash ﬂow. These higher dividend payouts
come at the expense of investment, thus are essentially borrowed from the future dividends.
The longer the ﬁrm is able to maintain the pretense, the bigger is the loan. At the time of
default the ﬁrm must borrow to return to the optimal investment path, thus will pay lower
dividends forever. The extent of borrowing is increasing in time to default.
Recall, that given the optimal investment strategy, the time to default is determined by
the free parameter ξ, which captures the degree to which the ﬁrm can hide disinvestment
before it is discovered (see equation (3)). By varying this parameter we can change the
relative size of the two regions: raising ξ increases the time to default for the concealing
14ﬁrm, but also forces it to borrow more after the default. Clearly, a decline in ξ increases
welfare losses due to higher disinvestment.
III.B.3 Asymmetric Information and Equilibrium Stock Prices
How does asymmetric information aﬀect the level of prices? The bottom panel of Figure 4
plots the price dynamics under the conceal equilibrium and compares it to prices under the
reveal equilibrium. As it can be seen, rational investors decrease the value of prices in the
conceal equilibrium, as they correctly anticipate the suboptimal investment behavior of the
manager post τ∗.
The behavior of prices at T ∗∗ is quite common in the market. Speciﬁcally, a failure to
meet dividend (earnings) expectations, even by a small amount, results in a large decrease
in the stock price. A large literature documents this phenomenon. Although our model is
very stylized, the basic intuition that meeting expectations / failing to meet expectations is
a strong signal of the true type of the ﬁrm is likely to hold in a more general model.
III.C Equilibrium at τ∗
We ﬁnally consider the manager’s incentive at time τ∗ to conceal or reveal the true state.
We begin with the simpler case in which the manager’s compensation is tied to dividends.



















Recall that after τ∗ there is no longer any uncertainty for the manager (even T ∗∗ is known),
and thus these two utility levels can be computed exactly.
Proposition 5: At time τ∗, dividends-based compensation yields the following utility



















A conceal equilibrium results if Ureveal
Div,τ∗ <U conceal




We now turn to stock-based compensation. In this case, the rational expectations Nash
equilibrium must take into account investors’ beliefs about the manager strategy at time
15τ∗. These beliefs in turn determine the price function. There are three intertemporal utility
levels to be computed at τ∗ depending on which equilibrium we are considering, conceal
equilibrium versus reveal equilibrium.
1. Reveal Equilibrium. In a pure strategy Nash reveal equilibrium, the price function is
the one supporting the equilibrium. Thus, the manager’s utilityis determined by P
after
fi,t
in equation (10) if at τ∗ the manager decides to reveal. In contrast, if the manager
decides to conceal, his utility is determined by the price function P
before
fi,t in equation



















2. Conceal Equilibrium. In a conceal equilibrium, if the manager follows the Nash equi-
librium strategy (conceal at τ∗), then the price function must be the asymmetric in-








If instead, the manager reveals at τ∗ the true state of the ﬁrm, the price function
reverts back to the full information price P
after
fi,t in equation (10). Thus, the utility
level is still given by (26) above.
The superscripts “fi”a n d“ ai” in the “conceal” utility functions (27) and (28) indicates
the use of a full information or asymmetric information price. The utility under reveal
strategy, instead, always uses the full information price, and so does not need qualiﬁcation.
Proposition 6: Let τ∗ ≥ h∗∗. Then, the CEO utility levels under the “reveal” and







z − g − δ
β − g
 
























in a conceal equilibrium (31)
Thus,
9If τ∗ <h ∗∗, the utility function U
conceal,j
τ∗ for j = ai,fi is more complicated, and it is left to the
appendix.
















Stock,τ∗ , as A
fi
λ >A ai
λ . This implies that the
two equilibria “conceal Nash” and “reveal Nash” are mutually exclusive. That is, it is not
possible to ﬁnd parameters for which both equilibria can exist at the same time. However, it
may happen that for some parameter combination, no pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
III.D Equilibrium Conditions
Corollary 2: A necessary and suﬃcient condition for a “reveal” equilibrium under the
dividends-based compensation is:
 
z − G − δ









This condition is satisﬁed if the return on capital net of depreciation is less than or equal
to the time discount: z − δ ≤ β. This latter suﬃcient condition is in fact too strong: even
if it is violated, i.e. z − δ>β , in our numerical calculations we were not able to ﬁnd
reasonable parameter values under which condition (32) is also violated. In other words,
dividend compensation generates a “reveal” equilibrium, leading to the optimal investments
by managers.
Exactly the opposite occurs under stock-based compensation. In this case we obtain the
following necessary and suﬃcient condition for a conceal and reveal equilibrium:10
Corollary 3: Let τ∗ ≥ h∗∗. A necessary and suﬃcient condition for a “conceal” equilib-
rium under stock-based compensation is
Aai
λ (r − g)








where the constant Aai
λ is given in equation (21). Similarly, a necessary and suﬃcient con-
dition for a “reveal” equilibrium under stock-based compensation is
A
fi
λ (r − g)








10Since the formulas are complicated for the case in which τ∗ <h ∗∗, we leave this case to the Appendix.
17where the constant A
fi
λ is given in equation (13).
Comparing equation (33) and (32), we see that stock-based compensation is more likely
to imply a conceal equilibrium than dividends-based compensation if
A
ai
λ (r − g) >z− G − δ (35)
From equation (21) we see that
A
ai
λ (r − g)=
 
r − g
r + λ − G
 
(z − G − δ)+λe
−(G−g)h∗∗
 
z − r − δ
r + λ − G
 
which implies that condition (35) is certainly satisﬁed whenever G>g+λ, that is, whenever
the initial growth rate G is suﬃciently high compared to the rate of growth of a mature ﬁrm,
g. Intuitively, when G is high, the price of stock is high as well, as it reﬂects the higher
potential growth in dividends. The higher stock price implies a higher compensation for the
ﬁrm’s manager, and thus generates a greater incentive for him or her to conceal the decrease
in g when it happens at τ∗. Indeed, as we shall see below, we ﬁnd that condition (33) is
satisﬁed for most parameter conﬁgurations, unless G is quite close to g. In the latter case
it may be not worth concealing and being ﬁred, as the impact of G on the stock price, and
thus on compensation, is small.
III.E A Numerical Example
When is it optimal to conceal the change in the growth rate of investment opportunities?
Figure 5 plots the areas in which pure strategy Nash conceal or reveal equilibria obtain
under stock-based compensation. The base numerical values of the parameters are as follows:
T h ed i s c o u n tr a t ei sr = 10%, the return on capital z = 20% with a depreciation rate of
δ = 1%. The free parameter regulating the minimum amount of capital ξ = 80%. The
subjective discount rate is β = 20% and the expected time of maturity E[τ∗]=1 /λ =1 5
years. Finally, at maturity, the ﬁrm moves to a growth rate g =0 % .
In each panel, we letthe initial growth rate of ﬁrm G range on the x−axisfrom a minimum
of 3% to a maximum of 16%, which is only 1% below the maximum possible value of G that
still yields a ﬁnite value of the ﬁrm (G<r+ λ). In each panel, the y−axis represents a
diﬀerent variable: in the top panel these are the values of g ranging between 3% and 16%.
In the middle panel, the y−axis represents the return on capital z, which ranges between
14% and 30%, and ﬁnally, in the bottom panel, the y−axis captures the expected time of
maturity of the ﬁrm E[τ∗]=1 /λ, that range between 3 and 25 years.
Starting with the top panel, we see that under stock-based compensation, even a small
diﬀerence between the two possible growth rates G and g is suﬃcient to induce a conceal
Nash equilibrium, in which the manager chooses the conceal strategy and investors ratio-
nally anticipate this behavior. As we know from the previous discussion, this equilibrium
18ultimately leads to a run-up in prices, culminating with a large negative reaction of prices
to a dividend (earnings) report that misses a target. In striking contrast, although not
reported in the ﬁgure, we could ﬁnd no combination of G and g such that the dividends-
based compensation would lead the manager to conceal the change in growth rate. That is,
dividends-based compensation always generates truth telling for a wide range of parameter
values. This diﬀerence in behavior under the two compensation regimes has been discussed
above: the intuition, recall, is that under stock-based compensation, the manager obtains a
much higher compensation if he conceals, compared to dividends-based compensation, be-
cause of the multiplier eﬀect that is generated by the present value formula in the discount
of future cash ﬂows.
Finally, stock-based compensation does not generate a reveal Nash equilibrium for any
combination of G and g. The intuition is as follows: if investors think that the manager will
follow a reveal strategy, the pricing function would reﬂect this belief and it is then given by
the perfect information pricing formula (12). However, given these high prices, it is optimal
for the manager to deviate and conceal the shift in investment opportunities. Thus, for small
diﬀerences between G and g no pure strategy equilibrium is supported: if investors believe
that the manager follows a reveal (conceal) strategy, it is optimal for the manager to deviate
and follow a conceal (reveal) strategy.
The middle panel of Figure 5 plots the areas of conceal and reveal equilibrium under
stock-based compensation in the (z,G) space, where z is the instantaneous return on capital.
We see that the conceal strategy choice is, once again, a pervasive equilibrium outcome. As
before, even in this case, we could not ﬁnd any combination of (G,z)t h a tw o u l dy i e l da n
optimal conceal strategy under dividends-based compensation. However, in contrast with
the top panel, there is a small region in which a reveal Nash equilibrium obtains under
stock-based compensation. This is the area in the top-left corner, in which G is small and
the return on capital z is high (note that for this case we had to increase the range of G to
include very low values of G). The intuition is that if growth is low, and return on capital
high, there is little gain from concealing the change in investment opportunities (G is low
anyway) and the cost of future repercussion is high, as the higher proﬁtability of investments
implies higher future prices, and thus a higher utility of the manager.
Finally, the bottom panel reports the conceal and reveal strategy areas under stock-
based compensation in the space (E[τ∗],G). The outcome is once again the same: the
conceal equilibrium prevails for most parameters, and especially for high growth G and high
expected maturity time τ∗ (or low λ). As before, for all combinations of parameters reveal
is optimal under dividends-based compensation.
These examples illustrate that there seems to be a broad dichotomy: the stock-based
compensation induces concealing strategy, while the dividend-based compensation yields
truth revelation. We now turn to endogenizing the compensation by introducing costly
eﬀort.
19IV Incentives and Managerial Eﬀort
We now expand our model to endogenize the compensation when it aﬀects the propensity
of the CEO to exert costly eﬀort that prolongs the ﬁrm’s high growth period. Formally,
the CEO can choose whether to exert high eﬀort eH or low eﬀort eL. The choice aﬀects
the probability λ of a shift to lower growth, such that λH <λ L (or E[τ∗|eH] >E [τ∗|eL]).
The CEO must actively search for investment opportunities, monitor markets and internal
development, all of which require time and eﬀort. In our model, these activities translate
into a smaller probability to shift to the mature state. Once the shift occurs, however, we
assume that there is nothing that the manager can do to put the ﬁrm back into the high
growth state.







0. We assume that eﬀort is neither observable nor veriﬁable. An audit, for instance, would
not reveal the past or present eﬀort choices. As before, we assume the manager’s utility is
linear in the payoﬀ wu, and it is given by
Ut = E
   T
t
e
−β(u−t) [wu (1 − c(eu))]du
 
, (36)
where T is the time the manager leaves the ﬁrm. The multiplicative form, standard in
dynamic models, ensures the homogeneity of the utility function with respect to the level of
payoﬀ, leading to optimal rules that are independent of the level of the payoﬀ per se.11
To see the link with the previous sections, note that after the slowdown event at τ∗ there
is no reason to exert any eﬀort, independently of the type of compensation or the equilibrium
after τ∗. It follows that eu = eL for u ≥ τ∗ and thus, c(eu)=0f o ru ≥ τ∗ in (36). The
utility function then reverts back to the one discussed in the previous section, and our earlier
conclusions hold. In particular, let Uτ∗ be the expected utility at time τ∗, conditional on
the decision to reveal or conceal. The exact formulas for the various cases are contained in
Propositions 5 and 6.
The expected utility for t<τ ∗ is then given by
Ut = Et
   τ∗
t
e




Note from equation (37) that λ aﬀects the utility Ut in two distinct ways: it aﬀects the
expected time till the decline in the growth options (i.e. τ∗) as well as the size of Uτ∗ through
the price of the stock Pτ∗. The latter eﬀect also determines the choice of the action (conceal
or reveal) at time τ∗. As we assume that the choice of eﬀort determines λ, it is clear that
the ex ante choice of eﬀort by the manager and the ex post choice of revealing or concealing
strategy are determined jointly. This means that the equilibrium in pure strategies may not
11We also analyzed the linear utility Ut = E
   T
t e−β(u−t)[wu − c(eu)]du
 
and obtained similar insights.
20exist for all parameter values. As we are interested in presenting the managerial incentives
in the most intuitive way, we only focus on cases where pure strategy equilibria exist.
IV.A Stock-based compensation.
We now derive the conditions under which the stock-based compensation induces high eﬀort,
conditional on concealing being the optimal strategy at time τ∗. Since we focus on a pure
strategy equilibrium, the equilibrium choice of eﬀort is common knowledge.
Proposition 7: Let t ≥ h∗∗ and let λH be such that a conceal equilibrium obtains at τ∗.
Then, high eﬀort eH is the equilibrium strategy if and only if
λL + β − G
λH + β − G
>
1+λLHStock






Condition (38) has an intuitive interpretation. First, if eﬀort is costly, but has a low
impact on λ, i.e. λH ≈ λL, then the condition is violated, and the manager never chooses
high eﬀort. Second, if exercising eﬀort costs little, i.e. cH ≈ 0, then the manager always
chooses high eﬀort. In other words, if it wasn’t for the fact that exercising eﬀort is costly
for the manager, he would always choose a high eﬀort eH with stock-based compensation.
The beneﬁt for the manager to exert a high eﬀort stems from the longer tenure period
(T ∗∗ is pushed forward) while enjoying earlier the long term reward of his eﬀort as they are
capitalized in the stock price.
IV.B Dividends-based compensation.
In this case, we concentrate our analysis on the reveal equilibrium at τ∗,which is by far the
most common outcome for essentially any parameter conﬁguration. We obtain the following:
Proposition 8: Let “reveal” be the equilibrium at τ∗.T h e n ,eH is the equilibrium if and
only if
λL + β − G
λH + β − G
>
1+λLHDiv




(z − g − δ)
(z − G − δ)(β − g).
Condition (39) is also intuitive. First, again, λH ≈ λL makes the manager exert low
eﬀort. Second, diﬀerently from the stock-based compensation (with conceal equilibrium),
21however, even a zero cost of eﬀort, cH = 0, does not necessarily guarantee that dividends-
based compensation induces the manager to exert high eﬀort. For this to be the case, it
m u s tb et h ec a s et h a t
(z − g − δ)




which is not necessarily satisﬁed. Indeed, this condition tends to be satisﬁed when the return
on capital z is especially high, or the manager’s discount rate β is low, relative to the growth
rate G. Intuitively, recall the dividend proﬁle under high growth and low growth discussed
in Figure 2: a high growth rate implies low dividends today, but high in the future. It is
worth to exert eﬀort and have a longer-lasting high dividends growth only if the manager is
particularly patient – as his payoﬀ today is low compared to the future – or the return on
capital is very high, so that dividends tend to be high as well.
IV.C High eﬀort under stock-based compensation
The key question is whether the stock-based compensation is more likely to produce a high-
eﬀort equilibrium, which is the good outcome for investors. The conditions in Propositions






(z − g − δ)
(z − G − δ)(β − g)
= H
Div.









then there exist parameter values for which:
1. (Low Eﬀort, reveal at τ∗) is an equilibrium for dividends-based compensation,
2. (High Eﬀort, conceal at τ∗) is an equilibrium for stock-based compensation.
Mechanically, Corollary 4 follows from the fact that its condition implies
1+λLHDiv
1 − cH + λHHDiv >
1+λLHStock
1 − cH + λHHStock,
which in turn implies that there are parameter value for which
1+λLHDiv
1 − cH + λHHDiv >
λL + β − G
λH + β − G
>
1+λLHStock
1 − cH + λHHStock. (41)
The statement of Corollary 4 then follows from Proposition 7 and 8.
22Intuitively, condition (40) requires that higher eﬀort increases the expected maturity
time τ∗ suﬃciently compared to the cost cH. In this case, as we had already discussed after
Proposition 7, a high eﬀort - conceal equilibrium prevails under the stock-based compensa-
tion. What about the low-eﬀort equilibrium under the dividends-based compensation? As
mentioned after Proposition 8, for high enough β, the manager prefers low eﬀort.
Figure 6 shows the partition of the parameter space of (z,G) into regions corresponding to
various equilibria.12 We start from the top-right corner: the triangle in that corner is the area
where the manager chooses high eﬀort regardless of the compensation mode. Consequently,
in this region compensating the manager based only on dividends achieves the ﬁrst best, as in
this case he would also reveal the bad news to investors, and thus maximize ﬁrm value. This
region is characterized by very high returns on investment, z, and very high growth rates.
Firms with such combination of parameters do not have to use stock-based compensation to
induce high eﬀort.
The region below and to the left of the top-right triangle is where the dividends-based
compensation no longer induces high eﬀort, while the stock-based compensation does, al-
though in a conceal equilibrium. This is indeed the most interesting region, where we observe
a trade-oﬀ between the eﬀort inducement and truth telling inducement - one cannot obtain
both. It seems that the ﬁrms with reasonably high growth rates and return on capital are
in that region. Finally, the region below and to the left from there is where we may no
longer have a pure strategy equilibrium. This is a region, where a stock-compensated man-
ager prefers to conceal if he chooses high eﬀort, but would no longer choose high eﬀort, if
conceals. Part of that region corresponds to the conceal-low eﬀort equilibrium (the worst
possible scenario), whenever it exists. The existence depends on λL:i td o e sn o te x i s tf o r
high levels of λL. The remainder of the region corresponds to equilibria in mixed strategies.
Solving for those is complicated, as the dynamic updating of investors’ believes becomes very
tedious. They are not likely to provide new intuitions, thus we ignore them. In fact we ﬁnd
the region above that, where the real trade-oﬀ takes place of most interest.
IV.D Dividends-based or stock-based compensation?
The implication of the discussion above is that unless the company is expected to have a very
large growth of investment opportunities, or a very large return on capital, it appears that
stock-based compensation is more likely to induce a high-eﬀort equilibrium. The drawback
is that a conceal equilibrium will follow, and with it, the suboptimal investment strategy dis-
cussed in subsection III.B The question is whether shareholders are better oﬀ with low eﬀort
and an optimal investment strategy, or high eﬀort and a suboptimal investment strategy.
Figure 7 plots hypothetical price and dividend paths under the stock-based compensation
equilibrium (high eﬀort, conceal) and the dividends-based compensation equilibrium (low
eﬀort, reveal). For comparison, it also reports the ﬁrst best, featuring high eﬀort and the op-
timal investment after τ∗. It appears from the ﬁgure, and follows from the earlier discussion,
12In fact the space is (z,G− g) as we assume g = 0 in these numerical calculations.
23that the dividends-based compensation may induce too low an eﬀort, and this loss outweighs
the beneﬁts of the optimal investment behavior. Stock-based compensation, in contrast, gets
closer to the ﬁrst best, benchmark case, yet also leads to suboptimal investment behavior,
which generates the bubble-like pattern in dividend growth and prices.
IV.E Inducing a high eﬀort / reveal equilibrium
We conclude this section with a possible solution to the problem. The earlier sections
showed that dividends-based compensation is successful in inducing a reveal equilibrium.
The drawback is that it induces low eﬀort. In contrast, stock-based compensation induces
a conceal equilibrium, but high eﬀort. A potential solution is in the middle. Consider a
performance-based contract which combines dividends and stock prices in the appropriate
proportion. Speciﬁcally, consider the following compensation scheme:
wt = ωηpPt +( 1− ω)ηdDt. (42)
The linearity of the utility function implies that for any t
UComb,t = ωUStock,t +( 1− ω)UDiv,t
We want to obtain a high-eﬀort / reveal equilibrium. We proceed as follows. Assume
that indeed the manager follows a high-eﬀort / reveal strategy, so that the equilibrium price
function is (12) with λ = λH. Conditional on the price function, we can search for the ω such
that reveal is optimal at τ∗ and high eﬀort is optimal before τ∗. The resulting conditions
are contained in Proposition 9.
For expositional convenience, we set the constant ηd = ηp/(r−g). This choice corresponds
to the case in which the utility from the revealing strategy is identical under either dividend
or stock compensation, as it can be seen from equations (24) and (29) in propositions 5 and
6. We obtain the following:








λL + β − G
λH + β − G
>
L1 (ω∗)+λLL2





λH +( 1− ω)
 




z − g − δ
(β − g)(r − g)
and A
fi
λH is in (13). Then the combined compensation w = ω∗ηpPt +( 1− ω∗)ηdDt achieves
the ﬁrst best equilibrium: high-eﬀort /reveal.
24Condition (43) guarantees that reveal is optimal at time τ∗, conditional on λ = λH in
the full information pricing function (12). The second condition (43) guarantees that high
eﬀort is optimal at t<τ ∗, conditional on reveal being optimal at time τ∗.
Figure 8 shows the range of stock share in the compensation package, ω, that can induce
the ﬁrst best outcome as a function of G.T h a t i s , t h o s e ω’s that satisfy both conditions
(43) and (44). The top panel corresponds to the case in which the return on capital is
z = 20% and the bottom panel to the case in which z = 25%. In each panel, the upper line
indicates the ω at which the manager is indiﬀerent between conceal and reveal strategies
under the high eﬀort choice. For values of ω below that the manager prefers to reveal, which
is what long term shareholders would like him to do. The lower line represents the level
of at which the manager is indiﬀerent between choosing high and low eﬀort, when he is in
a reveal equilibrium. For ω above that the manager prefers to exert high eﬀort. Thus the
area between the two lines represents all possible combinations of stocks and dividends in
the compensation package that would support the ﬁrst best.
Notice that when the lower line reaches zero, this means that dividend-based compen-
sation alone is enough to induce high eﬀort (recall the top-right corner in Figure 6). This
does not mean that a little stock-based component would necessarily ruin the incentives to
reveal, but aggressive stock compensation (or high proportion of ownership) will. This is
true for other levels of G as well: there is a range of compensation packages that induce the
ﬁrst best. Figure 9 shows the minimum weights in stocks for the whole range of G and z.
Another way to see the eﬀect of the optimal compensation package is by looking at Figure
10, which repeats Figure 6, while also indicating the area in which the ﬁrst best is obtained.
Compared with the only stock-based compensation, the combined compensation package
not only increases the area in which a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is obtained, but the
equilibrium is a ﬁrst best equilibrium, in that it achieves high eﬀort and revealing.
In conclusion, this section shows that the choice of a compensation package should be
ﬁrm-speciﬁc and depends on the ﬁrm’s characteristics. As a consequence, the exact com-
pensation package that induces the manager to act in the interest of the shareholders in all
stages of the life cycle of the ﬁrm has to be chosen carefully. In particular, excessive stock
compensation or too little stock compensation are clearly suboptimal choices for most cases.
This implies, for instance, that executives’ bonuses that depend exclusively on either earn-
ings or stocks performance are not advisable. For the same reasons, situations in which the
CEO owns a large packet of shares will also likely lead to suboptimal investment. Our model
suggests that the manager should either reduce his holdings to what would be prescribed
under the optimal compensation level, or commit to holding on to his shares for a very long
term, in return the company should tie a large part of his compensation to dividends.13
13Indeed, our model provides a rationale to the vesting of stock shares in compensation packages, although
the vesting period that is impliedby our model is much longer than the relatively standard three years (see e.g.
Figure 3). While theoretically it is advisable a long-term vesting, realistically the long term performance of
a ﬁrm depends on stochastic variables that are independent of the manager’s actions. Standard risk aversion
arguments would imply that managers would demand a large compensation in exchange for a longer vesting
of shares in their compensation contract.
25IV.F CEO’s incentives costs to the ﬁrm
In our analysis so far we have abstracted from the costs that diﬀerent incentive schemes
impose on the ﬁrm itself. For instance, inducing high eﬀort by using the combined com-
pensation package discussed in the previous section may be too costly, and thus the ﬁrm
could be better oﬀ with a low eﬀort equilibrium. Endogenizing the costs to the ﬁrm in our
dynamic model, however, is quite hard, as dividend ﬂows have to be adjusted depending on
the equilibrium, and the ﬁxed point that sustains the Nash equlibrium is harder to obtain.
However, we can approximate the size of these costs in the various equilibria by taking their
present value at the cost of capital of the ﬁrm (r). We can then compare the value of the
ﬁrm net of these costs across the various incentive schemes and gauge whether an incentive
scheme is too honerous compared to another.
More speciﬁcally, we approximate the total costs paid to the CEO under the various cases
by computing the following quantity:
V = E






where wt is the CEO compensation in the various cases. Indeed, consider ﬁrst as a benchmark
the pure dividend based compensation under full revelation and low eﬀort. This is an
equilibrium for most parameters. In this case, wt = ηdDt and, for given value of ηd,t h e














λL is given in (13).
In a similar fashion we can compute the present value of all payments to the CEO under
the stock compensation and conceal equilibrium in which the CEO exerts high eﬀort. In this
























z − G − δ




λ is given in (21).
We now notice that we have enough degrees of freedom to choose ηp such that the present





Div . Indeed, under a pure compensation scheme, the absolute
level of ηd or ηp has no impact on the decision to conceal or reveal at time τ∗.T h i s c a n
be easily seen by comparing the utility expressions (24) and (25) for the dividend-based
compensation, and expressions (29), (30) and (31) for the stock-based compensation. In all
26cases, the constants ηd or ηp drop out, and the CEO decision at time τ∗ is really independent
of this quantity.
The combined compensation, in constrast, depends on both ηd and ηp. The total cost




















λH is given in (13).
We now compare the costs to the ﬁrm from using these incentive schemes. We do so by
computing, for each case, the quantity Pt −Vt, that is, the ﬁrm value net of payments to the
CEO. We choose ηd = 5% as our benchmark value under dividend compensation and full
revelation. That is, in this case the CEO’s compensation equals 5% of ﬁrm value (see 46).




Div =( 1− ηd)A
fi
λL.





and compute the net value of the stock Pai,0−V
Conceal,H
Stock . Finally, given these two values for
ηd and ηp, we can compute the cost for the mixed compensation, V
Reveal,H
Comb and compute the




Comb . One additional choice has to be made in this case, namely,
the weight ω to use in the compensation scheme: as shown in Figure 8 there is a whole
range that would do. We choose the minimum ω that induces the CEO to exert costly eﬀort:
in this case, when G is high, the combined compensation boils down to a dividend-based
compensation with high eﬀort, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 8.
Figure 11 plots the ﬁrm value net of payments to the CEO for the three cases discussed
above, as a function of the high growth rate G and for two values of return on capital z.I n
both panels, the solid line corresponds to the mixed compensation case, which leads to a high
eﬀort/reveal equilibrium. The dotted line corresponds to the stock based, high eﬀort/conceal
equilibrium. Finally, the dashed line corresponds to the low eﬀort/reveal equilibrium. The
ﬁgure makes apparent two facts: First, inducing high eﬀort increases the net ﬁrm value,
especially for high growth companies. This is true for both the stock based compensation,
which has a conceal behavior as a side eﬀect, and the combined compensation. Second,
the combined compensation leads to a higher net ﬁrm value compared to the stock based,
conceal equilibrium case, although the diﬀerence is small when the return on capital is small.
This analysis, although approximate, shows that indeed, the combined optimal compen-
sation plan discussed in the previous section achieve the ﬁrst best without imposing too high
a burden on the company.
27V Conclusions
Our paper contributes to the debate on executive compensation.14 On the one hand, advo-
cates of stock-based compensation highlight the importance of aligning shareholder objec-
tives with managers’ and argue that compensating managers with stocks achieves the goal.
Detractors argue that stock-based compensation instead gives managers the incentives to
misreport the true state of the ﬁrm, and in fact even engage at times in outright fraudulent
behavior. This paper sheds new light on the debate by analyzing both the ex ante incentive
problem to induce managers to exert costly eﬀort to maximize the ﬁrms’ investment op-
portunities, and simultaneously to induce the manager to reveal the true state of the ﬁrm’s
outlook and thus follow an optimal investment rule.
We ﬁnd that stock-based compensation does in fact induce the manager to conceal a
weakening of the ﬁrm’s investment opportunities. In order to do so, the manager must
follow grossly suboptimal investment rules. This behavior destroys ﬁrm value. This problem
is particularly acute for growth ﬁrms. In stark contrast, a performance based contract that
is based on cash ﬂows or earnings (but not stocks) always achieve truth telling, and thus an
optimal investment strategy.
Stock-based compensation, however, is much more eﬀective than cash ﬂow based com-
pensation in inducing the manager to exert costly eﬀort and constantly seek additional in-
vestment opportunities for the ﬁrm. That is, stock-based compensation does in fact align the
manager’s objective with the shareholders’. This good outcome for the shareholders, though,
is countervailed by the fact that the manager will not reveal any worsening of the investment
opportunities if it happens, and will then invest suboptimally later on, as discussed above.
While we believe that the problem with stock-based compensation in growth ﬁrms is
widespread in general, the 1990’s Hi-Tech boom provides an interesting illustration of the
mechanism discussed in our model. This period was characterized by expectations of high
growth rates and high uncertainty, coupled with high-powered stock-based executive com-
pensation. Firms with perceived high growth options were priced much higher than ﬁrms
with similar operating performance, but with lower perceived growth options. We argue
that because of their high-powered incentives, executives had an incentive to present theirs
as high growth ﬁrms, even when the prospects of high future growth faded at the end of
the 1990s. Our analysis suggests that the combination of high-powered incentives and the
pretense of high growth ﬁrms will lead eventually to the ﬁrm’s stock to crash. Indeed, while
all the eﬀects in our paper are purely ﬁrm-speciﬁc, an extension of our model in which the
timings of a slow down in investment opportunities are correlated across ﬁrms may be able
to predict market crashes as well.15 We leave this extension to future research.
Finally, our model enables us to make a normative statement as well. In fact, we show
14See Hall and Murphy (2003), Bebchuk and Fried (2004), and Gabaix and Landier (2007) for recent
discussions.
15See Zeira (1999) and Hertzberg (2005) for models of market crashes that occur when market participants
suddenly realize that the unobserved aggregate state.
28that a combined compensation package that uses both dividends-based performance and
stock-based performance reaches the ﬁrst best, inducing the manager to exert costly eﬀort
and reveal any worsening of the investment opportunities, if it happens. Firm value is then
maximized in this case. Each component (dividends and stocks) in the combined compen-
sation package serves a diﬀerent purpose and thus they are both necessary “ingredients”:
the stock-based component increases the manager’s eﬀort to expand the growth options of
the ﬁrm, while compensating managers also proportionally to reported earnings signiﬁcantly
reduces his incentives to engage in value destroying activities to support the inﬂated expecta-
tions. It is crucial to realize, though, that the weight on stocks in the combined compensation
package is not identical across ﬁrms: for instance, high growth ﬁrms should not make much
use of stocks in their compensation package, while the opposite is true for low growth ﬁrms.
That is, there is no ﬁxed rule that work for every type of ﬁrm. As a consequence, generalized
regulatory decisions that ban stock-based compensation, for instance, or board of directors’
decisions on CEO compensation that are based on some “common wisdom” are particularly
dangerous, as they do not consider that each ﬁrm necessitates a diﬀerent incentive scheme.
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 : The dividend stream corresponding to a G ﬁrm is:
D
G
t =( z − G − δ)e
Gt. (57)
After τ∗, the manager of the g ﬁrm must reproduce this pattern for as long as possible, i.e.
as long as Kt >K t. Recall that for an arbitrary investment policy the dividend is:
Dt = z min(Kt,J t) − It, (58)
where Jt = eGτ∗+g(t−τ∗), as given in (7). Since the capital evolution is given by the diﬀerential
equation
dKt/dt = It − δKt,
it follows that the investment policy It that generates the required dividend stream DG
t in
(57) subject to (58) for at least some time, has to solve (17). Given the continuity of the
30solution of an ODE in its initial condition, Kt = f(Kτ∗), ODE (17) implies that the amount
of capital available at time t, Kt, is monotonically increasing in its starting value Kτ∗.S i n c e
T ∗∗ is determined by the condition KT ∗∗ = KT ∗∗ = hJT ∗∗, where the latter is exogenously
speciﬁed, but monotonically increasing, it follows from Lemma 1 that the optimal choice of
the manager of a g ﬁrm is to invest as much as possible in the technology at τ∗.G i v e n a
maximum amount Kτ∗ = Kτ∗− of capital available, this amount is the optimal solution. The
path for investments follows from It = z min(Kt,J t) − dKt/dt and equation (17). Q.E.D..
Proof of Proposition 3: The amount of capital at time τ∗ is Kτ∗ = Jτ∗ = eGτ∗
.A s
it can be seen, this amount enters the optimal solution (16) and (17) in a multiplicative
fashion. Indeed, we can rewrite (16) and (17) by pulling eGτ∗ as a common factor on the





















− (z − G − δ)e
G(t−τ∗) 
Since the initial condition of the ODE is Kτ∗ = eGτ∗
, we can deﬁne new variables ˜ Kt =
Kt/eGτ∗
and ˜ It = It/eGτ∗
. We then have that these latter two variables satisfy









= z min( ˜ Kt,e
g(t−τ∗)) − δ ˜ Kt − (z − G − δ)e
G(t−τ∗)
with initial condition ˜ Kτ∗ =1 . T h i s ˜ KT ∗∗ = heg(T ∗∗−τ∗) if and only if KT ∗∗ = hJT ∗∗ =
heGτ∗+g(T ∗∗−τ∗). That is, the distance between T ∗∗ and τ∗ is independent of the capital
accumulated up to τ∗, and thus default time is independent of τ∗ itself. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Consider ﬁrst the case in which t>h ∗∗. If default has not
been observed at time t, then a shift cannot have occurred before t−h∗∗. In other words, the
conditioning event is that τ∗ >t−h∗∗. Recalling that τ∗ has an exponential distribution, we





















That is, the default time T ∗∗ has still the exponential distribution
f(T
∗∗|no default by t)=λe
−λ(T ∗∗−t)
31The value of the ﬁrm at time t is then equal to the present value of dividends DG
t until
default (at time T ∗∗), plus the present value of PL
ai,T ∗∗ at default. That is
Pai,t = Et





s ds + e
−r(T ∗∗−t)P
L
ai,T ∗∗|no default by t
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z − r − δ + ξ(r − g)
(r − g)(r + λ − G)
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If t<h ∗∗, then the conditional distribution of T ∗∗ is zero in the range [t,h∗∗]: Indeed, even











s ds + e
−r(T ∗∗−t)P
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s ds + e
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :At time τ∗ the manager must decide whether he/she wants
to reveal the change in growth rate or not. Given that any change in dividend policy results
32in an audit, we know from Lemma 1 that if the manager decides to conceal the new growth
rate, he/she will choose an investment strategy to maximize the default time T ∗∗ given in
Proposition 2. In this case, the dividend path is DG
t until T ∗∗. The behavior after T ∗∗ does
not matter. If instead the manager decides to reveal the new state, the dividend path after
τ∗ is given by D
g

































−β(t−τ∗) (ηd(z − g − δ))e
Gτ∗+g(t−τ∗)dt






















  T ∗
τ∗
e
−β(t−τ∗)(ηd(z − G − δ)e
Gtdt
=( ηd(z − G − δ)e
Gτ∗











=( ηd(z − G − δ))e
Gτ∗
  
1 − e−(β−G)h∗∗ 
(β − G)
 
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 :At time τ∗ the manager must decide whether he/she wants
to reveal the change in growth rate or not. Given that any change in dividend policy results
in an audit, we know from Lemma 1 that if the manager decides to conceal the new growth
rate, he/she will choose an investment strategy to maximize the default time T ∗∗ given in
Proposition 2. In this case, the price path will be given by the one described in equations
(22) and (20) until T ∗∗. The behavior of prices after T ∗∗ does not matter. If instead the
manager decides to reveal the new state, the price path after τ∗ is given by P
after
fi,t in equation


























We concentrate on the conceal Nash equilibrium. The computations for the reveal equilib-
rium are identical. Note that after τ∗ there is no longer any uncertainty on the price path,






































ηp(z − g − δ)
(r − g)
 
































Note that the same calculation also yields the formula for the utility under a conceal
strategy but in a reveal equilibrium U
conceal,fi
Stock,τ∗ . The only diﬀerence is that Aai
λ has to be
substituted for A
fi
λ . This formula holds for every τ∗.





































































which equal the one above for τ∗ ≥ h∗∗, so that it converges there. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 :If eH is chosen, then λH is the probability of switching. Let
U
conceal,ai
Stock,τ∗ be the utility at τ∗ from the high eﬀort conceal equilibrium (i.e. using λH). Its
formula is in Proposition 6 for the two cases in which τ∗ <h ∗∗ and τ∗ >h ∗∗.W e n o w
compute the utility of the agent conditional to either eH or eL, and check that the utility






. For the case in which
t ≥ h∗∗,w eh a v e
UStock,t = E
   τ∗
t
e















































Note that the choice eH versus eL only aﬀects the integral, which is time independent. Thus,
if either eH or eL is optimal at t, it is optimal at any other time, as the objective function is






















1 − c(e)+λ(e)HStock 












1 − cH + λHHStock 
λH + β − G
>
 
1 − cL + λLHStock 
λL + β − G
which leads to the condition in the statement of the Proposition.
Conditional on eH being chosen by the manager, then λH applies, and a conceal equilib-
rium obtains at time τ∗. The price function Pt then is given by equation (20), concluding
the proof.
Formula for t<h ∗∗ In the case t<h ∗∗,i ti su s e f u lt od e n o t eb yUh∗∗ the utility






































We solve this numerically, and check whether Ut(eH) >U t(eL). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8. In this case, the reveal equilibrium is the prevailing outcome
for most parameter conﬁgurations, and we focus on this case. Thus, ex ante, the utility of
the entrepreneur (for any t)
UDiv,t = E
   τ∗
t
e
























ηd (z − G − δ)e

















(ηd(z − G − δ)(1− c(eu))) + λ(e)ηd





Gtηd (z − G − δ)
 
1 − c(eu)+λ(e)
(z − g − δ)
(z − G − δ)(β − g)
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(z − g − δ)
(z − G − δ)(β − g)
36we obtain the condition
U (eH) >U(eL)i ﬀ
 
1 − cH + λHHDiv 
β + λH − G
>
 
1 − cL + λLHDiv 
β + λL − G
or eH is the equilibrium outcome if and only if
β + λL − G
β + λH − G
>
 
1 − cL + λLHDiv 
[1 − cH + λHHDiv]
Since in this case there is no feedback eﬀect of prices on the decision of the manager, and
a reveal equilibrium obtains at τ∗ independently of his/her decision, the statement of the
proposition follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 4: The function
f (x)=
1+λLx
1 − cH + λHx















1 − cH 
− λH
(1 − cH + λHx)
2 > 0






P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 : First, we need to compute the condition that guarantees
a reveal strategy at time τ∗. Using the linearity of the utility function and the previous




















































































Deﬁning ηd = ηp/(r − g), and dividing through by ηp, we obtain condition (43).
Before τ∗ the equilibrium must support high eﬀort. So, suppose that in equilibrium λH
is the true λ, so that the above inequality must hold with A
fi
λH.B e f o r eτ∗ the utility using
the combined package depends on its two components, one that depends only on dividends,
and one that depends only on stocks. We can compute the two components separately, as
follows:
• Dividend Component: the utility under dividend compensation (and reveal at τ∗)i s
UDiv,t = E
   τ∗
t
e


















z − g − δ
β − g
  
Integration by parts and taking the integral yield
UDiv,t =
eGt
β + λ(e) − G
ηd
 
(z − G − δ)(1− c(eu)) + λ(eu)
 
z − g − δ
β − g
  
• Stock Component: Similarly, the utility under stock compensation (and reveal at τ∗)
is
UStock,t = E
   τ∗
t
e




















z − g − δ
β − g
  
Note that we use the full information price function, as it is common knowledge in a
Nash reveal equilibrium. Integration by parts and taking the integral yield
UStock,t =
eGt









z − g − δ
β − g
  
38Thus, the total combined utility before τ∗
UComb,t(e)=ωUStock,t +( 1− ω)UDiv,t
=
eGt

































holds if and only if condition (44) is satisﬁed. Q.E.D.
Proof of Formulas (47)



















where the ﬁrst integral stems from the fact that h∗∗ is the period during no revelation will







































The second term is instead computed as follows: recall that by deﬁnition of h∗∗ we have
T ∗∗ = τ∗∗ + h∗∗
E























λ (z − G − δ)E







λ (z − G − δ)e
−(r−G)h∗∗
E







λ (z − G − δ)e
−(r−G)h∗∗ 1
r + λ − G
where the last equality stems from the fact that τ∗∗ has an exponential distribution and the
use of integration by parts. Using this last result together with (59) yields (47). Q.E.D.
39Proof of Formulas (49) From the deﬁnition of V
Reveal,H
Comb and the linearity of the pay-



























where we used the fact that, by deﬁnition, P
before
fi,0 = E
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0 e−rtDtdt
 
. We now use the closed




















Thus, we need to compute
E





















fi,t dt + e




Integration by parts yields
E





fi,t dt + e























H z − g − δ
(r − g)
2














(r − G + λH)
Thus, the total cost to the ﬁrm in equation (49) follows. Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: Growth in Investment Opportunities. This ﬁgure reproduces the earnings proﬁle Yt as
a function of capital Kt, for three diﬀerent time periods t =0 ,t=1a n dt =2 .






























Figure 2: A dividend path (top panel) and a price path (bottom panel) under perfect information.
We use the following parameters: r = 10%, z = 20%, g =1 % ,G =9 % ,δ =1 % .

































Figure 3: The dynamics of capital and investments under reveal and conceal equilibrium after
τ∗. This ﬁgure shows the capital dynamics (top panel) and investment dynamics (bottom panel)
for a g ﬁrm pretending to be a G ﬁrm (dashed line), relative to the revealing strategy (solid line).
The vertical dotted line denotes “default” time T∗∗. The following parameters are used: r = 10%,
z = 20%, g =1 % ,G =9 % , δ =1 % ,λ =1 /15, ξ = .8.
































Figure 4: Dividend dynamics and price dynamics in reveal and conceal equilibria. The vertical
dotted line denotes time τ∗ of the growth change from G to g. The following parameters are used:
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Figure 5: Conceal equilibrium under stock compensation The ﬁgure reports the conceal and reveal
equilibria areas under stock compensation. In all ﬁgures, the x−axis reports the initial high growth
G, which ranges between 3% and 16%. In the top panel, the y−axis is the maturity g,w h i c ha l s o
ranges between 3% and 16%. In the middle panel, the y−axis is the return on capital z,w h i c h
ranges between 12% and 30%. In the bottom panel, the y−axis is given by the expected time to
maturity E[τ∗]=1 /λ, which ranges between 3% and 30%. The base parameters for the numerical

































High Effort / Reveal Eq.
Stock Comp.
High Effort / Conceal Eq.
Dividend Comp.
Low Effort / Reveal Eq.
Stock Comp.
No Pure Strategy Eq.
Figure 6: Equilibrium Areas under Stock Compensation and Dividend Compensation. In the
(z,G) space, the ﬁgure shows the areas in which the following equilibria are deﬁned: (a) the high
eﬀort / revealing equilibrium under dividends-based compensation; (b) the low eﬀort / revealing
equilibrium under dividends based compensation; (c) the high eﬀort / conceal equilibrium under
stock-based compensation. For all combination of parameters, dividend compensation generates a
reveal equilibrium. z ranges between 12% and 30%, while G ranges between 6% and 16%. The
remaining parameters are as follows: r = 10%, g =0 % ,δ =1 % ,λH =1 /15, λL =1 /2, cH = 10%,
β = 20%, ξ = .8.
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Price path under three equilibria
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Figure 7: Dividend and Price Paths in Three Equilibria. The Figure plots hypothetical dividend
(top panel) and price (bottom panel) paths under the case of “Stock-Based Compensation” (solid
line); “dividends-based Compensation” (dotted line); and the ﬁrst best Benchmark Case with
Symmetric Information and Optimal Invemstment (dashed line). Parameters used are r = 10%,
z = 20%, G =9 % ,g =1 % ,δ =1 % ,λH =1 /15, λL =1 /2, cH = 10%, β = 20%, ξ = .8.






return on investment z = 20%
ω






return on investment z = 25%
High Growth G
ω
Figure 8: Optimal Weight ω on Stocks in Compensation Package. This ﬁgure reports the range of
weights on the stock component of the combined compensation package that induces the ﬁrst best
for shareholders, that is, the high eﬀort / reveal equilibrium. In each panel, which only diﬀer for
the level of return on capital z, the top line is the maximum ω that still induces the manager to
reveal the shift in investment opportunuties, while the bottom line is the minimum ω that induces
the manager to exert high eﬀort. The remaining parameters are as follows: r = 10%, g =0 % ,
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Figure 9: Minimum Weight ω on Stocks in Compensation Package in a High Eﬀort / Reveal
Equilibrium. This ﬁgure reports the minimum weight on the stock component of the combined
compensation package that induces the ﬁrst best equilibrium, that is, high eﬀort / reveal equilib-
rium. Return on capital z ranges between 12% and 30%, while high growth G ranges between
2% and 16%. The remaining parameters are as follows: r = 10%, g =0 % ,δ =1 % ,λH =1 /15,
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Figure 10: Equilibrium Areas under Combined Stock and Dividends Compensation. In the (z,G)
space, in addition to the areas in Figure 6, this ﬁgure shows the equilibrium are for the optimal
combined compensation package. For all combination of parameters, dividend compensation gen-
erates a reveal equilibrium. z ranges between 12% and 30%, while G ranges between 6% and 16%.
The remaining parameters are as follows: r = 10%, g =0 % ,δ =1 % ,λH =1 /15, λL =1 /2,
cH = 10%, β = 20%, ξ = .8.
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Figure 11: Firm Value Net of CEO’s Incentive Contract Cost. This ﬁgure compares the ﬁrm
value net of the CEO incentive contract costs in the ﬁrst best equlibrium under the combined
compensation package (solid line) to the ﬁrm value under (a) dividend compensation when CEO
exerts low eﬀort (dashed line), and (b) stock based compensation when CEO exerts high eﬀort but
conceals the worsening of investment opportunities at τ∗ (dotted line). Each panel corresponds to
a diﬀerent return on capital z. The combined package in each panel is the one corresponding to
the minimum weight ω to stock that still induces the CEO to exerts high eﬀort. ηd = 5% while
for each panel ηp is chosen so that the cost to the ﬁrm under case (a)a n d( b) is the same, and
thus diﬀerens across G and z cases. The remaining parameters are as follows: r = 10%, g =0 % ,
δ =1 % ,λH =1 /15, λL =1 /2, cH = 10%, β = 20%, ξ = .8.
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